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CHAPTER •I
INTRODUCTION
The division of the Korean peninsula into North and
South, a legacy of the Cold War, was turned into a hot war
in 1950.

Because of its bitter experiences in this war,

South Korea has remained one of those countries where anti
communist sentiment runs very high despite the changes that
have taken place in the world since 1950.

Even when the

era of Cold War yield to that of detente in the 1970s, the
Cold War in Korea continued between the two competing
states.
The Korean peninsula is a strategically important
area

where the interests of four powers— China, Japan,

the Soviet Union, and the United States— intersect.

His

torically, Korea has served as a buffer state between
China and the Soviet Union, and between Japan and the
Soviet Union.

It is natural that each of these powers

wants Korea to remain friendly to itself.

If one of them

seeks to exercise hegemony over Korea, the latter cannot
help but fall victim to the conflict between the contending
powers as demonstrated by the Sino-Japanese at the end of
i
Richard H. Solomon, Asian Security in the 1980st
Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition (Santa Mon
ica, California:
Rand Corporation, 1979)i p. 110.
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the 19th Century and the Russo-Japanese wars that occurred
at the beginning of this century.

A very similar situation

has existed since World War II.
In addition, the transformation of Sino-Soviet rela
tions from alliance to confrontation in the 1970s provided
the major impetus to the trend toward diversity in the glo
bal balance of power.

This was inevitable because the United

States began to negotiate with the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and the Soviet Union instead of confronting them.

As

these two communist giants themselves sought detente with
the Western powers,

such detente made it possible for other

communist countries also to explore better relations with the
Western countries.

Since President Nixon made the famous

trip to Beijing in February,

1972, all the major powers have

normalized their bilateral relationships with one another.
Consequently, the bipolar world of the Cold War was replaced
in Northeast Asia by a four-power balance involving the
United States, Japan, the PRC, and the Soviet Union.

With

regard to Korea, the interests of these powers diverse some
what, but they do not seem to want any change in the exist
ing territorial status ,quo on the Korean peninsula.

But such

events as the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty, and Sino-American normalization have
made the rivalries among the Asian powers more volatile than
before.
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Stability of Korean Peninsula

The Sino-Soviet competition is becoming sharper over
the Korean peninsula, and in particular over the behavior of
North Korea.

Since the latter borders on the two communist

powers, both China and the Soviet Union have been trying to
place North Korea in its own sphere of influence.

In fact,

both Beijing and Moscow concluded treaties of alliance and
cooperation with Pyongyang in 1961.

While Pyongyang has

endeavored to maintain its neutrality in this rivalry, be
cause of its geographic proximity and cultural affinity, it
has leaned toward Beijing in recent years.

Despite this com

petition, however, the Korean question is no longer a direct
obstacle to Beijing's and Moscow's rapprochement with Wash
ington.

In this sense, therefore, North Korea could become

increasingly "North Koreanized" and pursue a more independent
foreign policy.

4
Thus, I may hypothesize thati
the more intense Sino-Soviet competition
becomes over North Korea, the more inde
pendent military action of North Korea
will become.
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Shown on Figure 2-A, just as the tides are the high
est when the gravitational pulls of the sun and the moon
join together, North Korea was strong when the gravitational
pulls of the PRC and the Soviet Union were aligned as in the
beginning of the Korean War in 1950.
Therefore, this paper is confined toi

first,

research of the two communist giants vying for influence
over North Korea and the relationships among the three coun
tires.

It covers the border clash from 1969 to 1978, a ten-

5

year period (shown on Figure 2-B, C).

Secondly, to examine

closely the reactions of the other side when North Korea on
the pendulum moves from one side to the other.

Thirdly, to

analyze the Sino-Soviet conflict and its impact on North
Korea (shown on Figure l).
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CHAPTER It
THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE DIVERGENCE OF
MARXISM-LENINISM
Political ideology is an institution that is used to
further a country's national interest.

The existing ideolo

gies vary from pluralist democracy to communist socialism,
and a specific national interest may be defined as whichever
nation-building stage is being highlighted in the political
system at a given time on the basis of these two variables-ideology and national interest.

International conduct can

be constructed that may be applied to the analysis of con
temporary world politics.
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Types of International Conduct
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A major activity of many scholars of communism has
been the attempt to identify the causes or sources of the
Sino-Soviet conflict.
activity.

No consensus has resulted from this

However, four fundamental viewpoints have emerged

on the Sino-Soviet conflict*

(l)

the conflict originated as

a struggle for control of the world communist movement and
was made virtually inevitable by the appearance of a second
powerful center in that movement.

(2)

The clash between

China and the Soviet Union simply reflects the national
interests of the two states; the perceptions of national
interest involved are determined by historical,
geopolitical factors.

(3 )

cultural, or

The conflict arose from the

vastly different levels of development attained by the two
societies; that is, it is primarily economic in origin.

(4)

The split originated in essentially different interpreta
tions of Marxism-Leninism by the ideologically oriented
elites who dominate the two political systems.

The view

points outlined above are, of course, not necessarily mutu
ally exclusive.

Nevertheless, a major problem in all of

these explanatory approaches concerns the relationship
between ideology and power.
An obvious answer to the difficulties encountered in
attempts to assess the relative importance of ideology and
^William E, Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cam
M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 49-54•
Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York:
Put
n a m ’s, 1963)» PP« 236-324.
bridge:
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power in communist politics is that Marxism-Leninism is,
above all, an ideology of power.

All ideologies must, of

course, deal with power relationships; Marxism-Leninism is
distinguished by the fact that it explicitly ties the achieve
ment of utopian social goals to the development of a particu
lar kind of political organization and the amassing of social
power by that organization.

Thus, for a Marxist-Leninist any

question of ideology is immediately a question of political
power; any question of political power is immediately a ques
tion of ideology.

This conjunction of ideology and power

means that a satisfactory analysis of conflict between com
munist party-state systems is unlikely without consideration
of ideology,

for a major function of the ideology is the

explanation or justification of power relationships.
The Sino-Soviet conflict can best be understood in
terms of the Marxist-Leninist theory of social development.
The reasons are threefold.

First, the Soviets and the Chin

ese explain fundamental conflicts within this frame of refer
ence.

Second, the application of different developmental

models, both purportedly Marxist-Leninist,

appears to have

directly resulted empirically in severe conflict situations.
And finally,

continuation of the power of dominant elites in

these communist political systems is dependent upon the valid
ity of the propositions contained in their respective vari
ants of developmental theory;

moreover, these elites

explicitly attribute the legitimacy of their control of

9

these societies to Marxist-Leninist developmental theory.
Developmental theory provides the essential theoreti
cal link between the other two major components of communist
ideology:

the basic worldview or philosophical grounding set

by dialectical materialism and the vision of the future com
munist utopia.

As such, it is obviously the most flexible

part of the ideology; it also provides the rationale by which
communist leaders constantly justify their specific

politi

cal actions.
In Marxist theory, political power has its basis in
functional specialization or the division of labor.

Material

need or functional necessity produces a differentiation of
social structure and leads to the development of political
structures controlled by dominant classes.

In other words,

functional specialization is a necessary response to material
needs and necessarily produces variations in social and
political power.

So long as the production of material

goods falls short of abundance,

functional specialization

continues, as does the predictable conflict between dominant
and dependent social elements, who struggle for the control
of scarce resources.

Over time, development of the forces

of production erodes and eventually destroys the material
basis for the power of dominant social elements,
elimination of economic necessity.

through the

Human material need is

the vital force driving mankind toward achievement of the
abundant, nonrepressive society.
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Regimes established under the standard of MarxismLeninism are not immune to the material necessity identified
by Marx, or to the production of conflict endemic to the
developmental process identified by him.

Moreover, these

regimes face the severe problem of equating empirical change
in the social system with the change dictated by Marx's
developmental model.

Starting from a much lower level of

development than that indicated as the revolutionary take-off
stage in the original Marxian model, they must carry out the
revolutionary economic development produced by capitalism in
the original model and show that the essential substitution
of political for economic means will lead to the same goal.
Many roads to communism approach means, of course,
that the communist system itself accepts and itself begins
to generate that structural differentiation which, in Marx
ism, contains such conflict-producing propensities.

However,

if the economically less advanced countries are moving in the
same general direction as the more advanced countries in
their processes of development, there is no problem.

More

over, even if this is not the case, the underlying problem
can be rather effectively masked between crises, if the cen
ter is in a clearly dominant position, as was done by Khru
shchev in late 1950s with his conceptualization of the
Socialist Commonwealth.
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If there is no single power center, the situation is
vastly changed.

Where there are differences in levels of

development, different "roads to communism" are virtually
inevitable.

The resulting development must be explained by

each communist party-state's spokesmen in terms of relevance
to the ultimate goal.

The survival of any single regime

with a divergent social development constitutes a denial of
the validity of all other approaches.

The interests of the

dominant elites in the communist party-states with divergent
patterns of development become inextricably tied to the com
peting claims to legitimacy that are central to ideological
conflicts.
Such conflicts are difficult to contain or resolve
without coercion.

Conflict resolution through bargaining

inevitably involves concessions and compromise; here, diver
gent patterns of social development assume crucial impor
tance.

Ihe inception of bargaining over ideological ques

tions means at least provisional recognition of the legiti
macy of one's bargaining partner's regime.

Real settlement

of ideological issues by such methods would have to include
explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the bargaining
partner's social system, thus posing a direct threat to the
legitimacy of the dominant political elites in the countries
involved.

The reason lies in Marxist ideological claims to

universality.

From the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism,

Com

munist Party elites are legitimized by the claim that their
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behavior and ideological positions represent the coining
universalization of social relations, which will be charac
terized by the absence of classes and group conflicts.

Ack-

knowledgment of the validity of another approach to communism
necessarily means some diminution of the legitimacy of a par
ticular Communist Party's elite,
universality.

some weakening of claims to

But one need not consider these matters from

the standpoint of the Marxist-Leninist view of legitimacy;
there is a very practical matter involved.

In communist

party-states, where competing ideologies cannot be overtly
expressed, the party elite's claim to represent the future
of mankind,

constantly repeated, is a powerful weapon for

inducing compliance.

Acceptance of a different approach to

communism in communications media dominated by the elite
suggests the possibility of political alternatives.

This

break in the monolithic pattern of communications may in
crease the potential for domestic dissent and so undercut
elite power.
Mao has long demonstrated a profound awareness of
these problems of social development.

He has, in fact,

shown a willingness to sacrifice economic development,

at

least in the short run, in order to prevent the bourgeoisification of Chinese society.

This motivation appeared

clearly in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.-^

Mao

-'Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese
Political System,"
China Quarterly B8 (April-June 1969);6391.
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has pushed for achievement of an undifferentiated social
structure while economic modernization is in progress.

In

practice, this has meant a drive for social atomization more
in accord with the traditional model of totalitarianism for
merly accepted by most Western scholars than with the actual
practice of the Soviet system.

Despite severe conflict, or

perhaps because of it, Mao has succeeded to a significant
degree in shaping Chinese society to his vision of developLl
ment.
The Maoist thrust for a more fluid social organiza
tion adds structural differentiation to the initial develop
mental divergence between the two societies.

All of this is

reflected in the contrasting evolution of developmental
theory in the two systems.

The Soviet model of development

in the contemporary epoch could be characterized as the
routinization of revolution; that is, the Soviets view tech
nological development and technical expertise as the princi
pal forces in social transformation.
tains distinct anarchistic tendencies,

The Chinese model con
emphasizing what the

Maoists call "the factor of man," in the Chinese view, social
transformation can be carried out independently of technolo
gical development by application of the human will.
k

Tillman Durdin, "The New Face of Maoist China,"
Problems of Communism XX (September-October 1971)*1-13.
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The Divergence in Developmental Theory
Permanent Revolution
The Maoist concept of permanent revolution differs
considerably from Marx's "revolution in permanence" and from
Trostsky's "permanent revolution."^

The concept has two

essential and distinctive features.

First, the revolution

must be uninterrupted.

As one stage or process is completed,

there must be immediate movement to the next stage or pro
cess.
ism.

Second, revolution continues in the stage of commun
The process of change is qualitatively different under

communism, but change continues to occur through qualitative
leaps.

This concept of permanent revolution is quite consis

tent with, and indeed is inextricably tied to, Mao's general
theory of contradictions and disequilibrium.
The revolutionary strategy involved here is dictated
by Mao's concerns about structural development.

Of course,

uninterrupted revolution during the stage of building social
ism is related to the overwhelming tasks of Chinese economic
development.

No such motivation can be ascribed to Mao's

projected revolution in Communist society unless he has re
jected all previous Marxist formulations concerning the
material base of communism.

Clearly, Mao is concerned about

the tendency of social structures to form and harden and deny
the projected universal unity at every stage of development#
■^Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of
the Permanent Revolution, 1958-1969," China Quarterly 46
(1971)*221-2 3 8 .
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Although all political structures, including the Communist
Party, are subject to the universal law of contradictions,
the great danger is that the principal contradiction may
turn out to be the contradiction between dominant political
structures and the underlying material base.

If one politi

cal structure is destroyed through its internal contradic
tions, another may arise to take its place.

Uninterrupted

revolution rapidly intensifies the existing contradictions
and prevents the rise of the feared structural power.

The

political strategy associated with Mao's theory of disequili
brium thus provides his answer to the long-run problem of
structured and separate political power.

In this general,

theoretical approach to power, there is no necessary connec
tion with social class, and so Mao takes another step away
from the underlying economic motivations of the Marxian
model.
These Maoist concerns are not reflected in the
thought of contemporary Soviet theorists.

While there is

no great concern for the problem of increasing complexity
of social structure at advanced levels of development, no
Soviet theorist admits the possibility of a real conflict
of interest between the Communist Party and society as a
whole.
View of Class
Social class does not have the same importance for
Marxists as for other Marxists.

Moreover,

against the Soviet

16

adherence to the orthodox view concerning, the objective basis
for class development, the Maoists have put forward a loose
and contradictory concept of class containing both objective
and subjective elements.
In the Maoist view, the class struggle is an objec
tive reality independent of man's will.

The origin of social

class is the division of labor, and social class is deter
mined by one's relationship to the means of production.
is an orthodox Marxist position.

This

However, while this ortho

dox view continues to be maintained in Beijing,

an antithe

tical conception of class is advanced without acknowledgment
of any contradiction.
This formulation is quite consistant with the Maoist
distinction between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contra
dictions and the possibility of continuation of several
parties into the stage of communism.

It appears that, for

Mao, the primary political aspect of the phase of socialism
is something other than the resolution of class conflict.
Moreover,

during the Cultural Revolution,

certain assertions

concerning classes and class struggle were put forward which
definitely conflict with Marxist orthodoxy, and these asser
tions have not subsequently been disavowed.

A subjective

definition of the term "proletariat," emphasizing adherence
to "Mao Tse-tung thought," was consistantly found in the
Maoist polemics.

During the Cultural Revolution,

an attempt

was made to purge the party along "class lines," class lines
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were determined by attitudes toward the thoughts of Mao.
Mao, like Bakunin, acknowledges the existence of an
economic basis for class conflict.

Mao appears to recognize

that something more fundamental than the class struggle is
going on in society.

With Bakunin, the fundamental struggle

is against all forms of political power.
against bureaucratic forms of power.

It is a struggle

Mao's special contri

bution here is the suggestion that class struggle and the
nature of classes themselves can be transformed outside an
economic context.
The Material Basis for Revolution
In Marxist theory, material development is an abso
lute precondition for fulfillment of the substantive goals
of social change and the transformation of human nature.

The

orthodox viewpoint is still fully accepted by Soviet theore
ticians.

Mao made a virtue of necessity, arguing that the

primitive level of development facilitated revolutionary
transformation because poor people were naturally disposed
toward change, action, and revolution.

Again, Mao is dealing

with what is for him the overriding structural problem.
If the revolutionary transformation were to begin at
advanced levels of economic development, the existing complex
social structure would pose a major obstacle; for Mao, for
malized social and political structures are coincident with
^Ralph L. Powell, "The Party, the Government, and the
Gun," Astan Survey 10(6) (1970)*464.
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resistance to change.

At advanced levels of economic develop

ment, vast disparities in social and political power ordin
arily mean that powerful forces exist which have a material
interest in resisting the revolutionary goals of equality and
monolithic social organization.

In the Maoist view, this is

true alike of bourgeois societies, which pose the threat of
counterrevolution.
Primitive social development alone provides the
objective conditions for effective confrontation of this
potential problem.

Here the material basis has been inade

quate for development of a power really threatening to the
revolution by economic forces or bureaucracies.
have no stake in socio-political inequality.

The masses

On the con

trary, according to the Maoists, the masses are prone to a
value-identification with ideological leaders who posit the
goals of an abundant society and an undifferentiated social
structure.

If this linkage between leaders and masses can

be firmly established at the outset of the developmental
process, then the rise of separate, essentially anti-revolu
tionary centers of power among intermediate social and poli
tical structures can be prevented.

Thus, for the Maoists,

the most important social transformation occurs at the outset
of revolution and is not only independent of but also prior
to economic development.
Contradictions and Disequilibrium
A theory of contradictions was crucial in Marx's
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thought.

Engels extended Marx's conception of contradictions

to develop an all-encompassing phenomenology that he claimed
to be universally valid.

Mao has attempted to deal with the

logical problem involved in Engels' phenomenology, which had
become accepted as part of Marxist-Leninist dogma— how can a
phenomenology of universal disequilibrium be made consistent
with the vision of ultimate order contained in Marx’s philo
sophy of history?

Mao has done this by emphasizing, more

than any other theorist, the distinction in Marxism-Leninism
between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions.
According to Mao,

contradictions are at the center of

all phenomena and will continue there even in the stage of
communism.

However, in that ultimate stage, contradictions

will be nonantagonistic contradictions.

Moreover, Mao does

not tie social contradictions to control of the means of pro
duction so stringently as was done in Marxism.

His distinc

tion between the national bourgeoisie and the compradors,
which was central to the New Democracy,

8

shows clearly that

Mao was thinking at a very early date in terms of a more
fluid structural development than that postulated by Marx and
Lenin.

Given the primitive level of economic development at

tained at the outset of revolution, the rather rigid Marxian
7
'Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign
Policy (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California
Press, 1970), p. 25.

8

Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy," in Selected Works.
Vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965)* pp» 339348.
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framework associated with control of the means of production
might pose virtually insuperable obstacles to economic devel
opment.

That is, if the dominant structure in production was

poorly developed,
place it.

so was the counterstructure that would re

This is not to say that M a o ’s theory of contradic

tions was simply a response to Chinese developmental problems;
however, his theory, which lies at the heart of Maoist ideo
logy, was obviously consistent with his perception of the
awesome problem of economic development in China.
Lenin dealt
base for revolution

with the problem ofan inadequate social
in his Two Tactics.

superficially similar to Mao's;

His solution was

augmentation of the revolu

tionary force by other elements opposed to the existing
political order.

Since the proletariat was the only truly

revolutionary force, however, this alliance could be only
temporary.

Moreover, the economic development directed by

the vanguard would create in the long-run the social base
for unity which would make such expedient accretions of
political power superfluous.

With Mao, coalition formation

loses its quality of temporary tactic and becomes enmeshed
in

his overall view of the sources of social conflict.

isreflected clearly in Mao's assertion

This

that a coalition of

many parties might continue into the stage of

communism.^

In Mao's thought, particular social structures do not neces
sarily and automatically yield patterns of social conflict;
Q

Stuart R. Schram, "The Party in Chinese Communist
Ideology," China Quarterly 38 (1969) 111.
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what is essential is the attitudes associated with formation
of the structures and their continuation.

Whether a parti

cular contradiction is antagonistic depends less upon one's
relationship to control of the means of production than upon
one's attitude toward the ongoing historical movement.
sources of conflict are both internal and external.

The

Mao has

thus excised a portion of Marx's behavioral teleology and has
opened up the possibility of the development of consciousness
independent of economic forces.

As Soviet writers quite

rightly claim, M a o ’s theorizing contradictions within the
people strikes directly at the class basis of Marxism.

10

The current Soviet viewpoint on contradictions is
basically that of Stalin’s gradualism, with allowances made
for possible sudden intensification of contradictions and
consequent upheavals owing to the increasingly desperate
tactics of the imperialists as the power of the capitalist
system declines.

11

The internal basis for such upheavals is

primarily increasing antagonistic contradictions that arise
because of the increasing complexity of social structure
associated with economic development.

Such upheavals are,

100 . Vladimirov, et al., "On the 50th Anniversary of
the Communist Party of China," International Affairs 9 (1971)*
63.
^ A . Sovetov, "The Present Stage in the Struggle
Between Socialism and Imperialism," International Affairs 11
(1968):3-7; I. Uleimik, ’Leninism and the International Sig
nificance of the Experience Gained in Socialist Construction,"
International Affairs (February-March 1970) s27-2 9 .
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of course, unwelcome; they are to be guarded against by a
strengthening of the superstructure.

Without sacrificing

entirely the model of contradictions upon which the Maoist
theory is based, the Soviets have moved toward a view of
imposed equilibrium within socialist society, amid the gen
eral necessary disequilibrium among conflicting world sys
tems .
The Maoist theory of contradictions provides a
theoretical basis for social change which differs from both
the original Marxian and the contemporary Soviet models.

If

contradictions inhere in every political structure, whether
antagonistic or not,

disequilibrium is inevitable.

Realiza

tion of the ultimate utopia is unlikely either through his
torically necessary structural development or through the
imposition of political structures upon society.

But the

process remains, engendered by the unavoidable appearance
of contradictions.

Both conflict and order are internalized,

and Mao moves away from the objective framework so dear to
Marx.

For Mao, disequilibrium is a problem only when viewed

from the standpoint of structure; when viewed in another
perspective,

it becomes a positive blessing.
Military Means

Mao's maxim that "political power grows out of the
barrel of a gun" flows directly from the analysis underlying
the Peking Road doctrine.

Under conditions of primitive

social and economic development, with an inadequate prole-
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tarian base, revolution became crucially dependent upon
change in the internal, balance of forces through application
of violence by military forces; military means took precedence over political means.

12

For Mao, the means dictated

by Chinese experience appeared to assume over time a quality
of universal validity.

According to Mao, the seizure of

power by armed force, the settlement of issues by war is
the central task and highest form of revolution.

Much more

significant is the fact that the military forces have a key
role not only in the overthrow of political regimes but also
in the revolutionary transformation of society after the
seizure of power.

Despite M a o ’s subjective approach, he

also requires a structural basis for power.

The army forged

in the revolutionary struggle and thus uniquely armed with
revolutionary consciousness, becomes the principal force
available to direct the revolutionary transformation of
society.
The Soviets have increased their emphasis upon
military means in recent years; this has resulted in part
from the pressures of the Sino-Soviet split and in part from
the problems of cohesion of the East European bloc which led
to the elaboration of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The political

upgrading of the Soviet military forces is reflected in the
12

Franz Michael, "A Design for Aggression," Problems
of Communism XX, 1-2 (January-April 1971);65; Donald E.
Davis, "Marxism and People's Wars," Orbis XV ^ (Winter 1972):
1199.
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the increase in the percentage of military men on the new
Central Committee elected at the Twenty-fourth Party Con
gress. ^

Nevertheless,

the Soviet leadership continues to

insist upon the primacy of political over military means
within socialist systems.

Inroads by military officers into

leading party bodies remain quite limited, despite their
recent gains; it seems clear that now, as in the past, mili
tary leaders cannot be regarded as potential competitors for
political power against the civilian leadership of the CPSV.
The Role of the Party
The CCP has never gained the kind of dominance
usually possessed by the party in communist party-states.
The CCP apparently has also never been regarded as the sole
i Zj,
bearer of legitimacy within the political system.
For
Mao, legitimacy is tied to process but evidently not to
specific organizations involved in social development.

The

Soviets, on the other hand, continue to insist upon the
centrality of the party's role in the developmental process,
and in fact call for the strengthening of the party as an
organizational system at advanced levels of development.
The contrasting theoretical formulations summarized
above are related to the extreme differences in levels of
^ R o b e r t H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central
Committee:
An Assessment of the New Elite," World Politics
XXIV 3 (April 1972)09^.
1^
Schram, "Party in Chinese Ideology, pp. 5-7 .
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social and economic development between the two societies at
the inception of their revolutions.

However, practical

application of these theoretical formulations has served
also to create essentially different social and political
structures and additional differences in developmental pro
blems.

The Soviet model is much more conducive to further

differentiation of social structure.

The Chinese model

invites disruptions in economic development.

Application of

the models produces effects that are virtually certain to
have decisive impact upon relations between the two commun
ist party-states and upon their roles in the international
political system.
1.)

These effects may be briefly summarized:

The two models contain contrasting assumptions

concerning the sources of political power.

For the Soviets,

political power is economically based, and Soviet power has
been, and continues to be, dependent upon development of
economic structure.

For the Maoists, political power arises

from mobilization of the masses.
2.)

The two models point toward different centers

of power and different ancillary power structures.

In the

Soviet Union, the power center is a massive party bureau
cracy that owes its existence to its specific role in Soviet
economic development.

In China, the power center is an

inner-party or supra-party ideological elite.

In the Soviet

Union, the ancillary structures are composed of technologi
cally oriented elites, principally the Soviet military-
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u
industrial complex. J

In China, the primary ancillary

structure is the army.
3 .)

Application of the Soviet model is less likely

to lead to domestic political instability than is application
of that of the Maoists.

The Chinese emphasis upon revolution

‘'from below" makes likely, and Mao has actively promoted, per
iodic revolutionary convulsions directed against domestic
bureaucracies.

The Soviet model, on the other hand, empha

sizes controlled and relatively low-key mobilization of the
4

masses and is specifically directed toward the containment
of political instability.

These different approaches are

likely in the short-run to accentuate the substantial Soviet
advantages in political, military, and economic power.

How

ever, in the long-run, the power of these major communist
party-states is dependent upon their relative success in
applying the models and upon world trends of development.
If the Maoist model has general validity, Soviet power will
be ultimately overwhelmed by bourgeoisification and inescap
able contradictions of socialism.

On the other .hand, if the

Soviets are right about the essential parallelism between
structural and functional development, then the Chinese
communists cannot generate enough political power to make
possible the continuation of the Maoist system.
1 *5

China faces

^Vernon V. Aspatunan, Internal Politics and For
eign Policy in the Soviet System, Approaches to Comparative
and International Politics (Evanstons
Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 212-221.
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the problem of technological encirclement; the Soviets
confront the problem of structural fragility.

Thus devel

opmental theory is not simply an abstraction; it is crucially
tied to the survival of these conflicting systems.
Ideological Struggle and Sino-Soviet Relations
It appears that developmental theory is both an
indicator of primary conflict and a source of secondary
conflict among communist political systems.

The Soviet and

Chinese variants of Marxist-Leninist developmental theory
originated in the interests of dominant political structures
confronted internally with vastly different patterns of
social relationships.

In other words, the emergence of

different approaches to social development can be explained
largely as a matter of reaction to developmental levels al
ready attained at the outset of revolution.

If this were

the only aspect of the conflict, we would have a simple
struggle between the "haves” and the ’’have-nots.”

This ini

tial divergence was complicated, however, by the pronounced
tendency of communist elites to legitimize their actions by
reference to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Over time, the

political elites in the Soviet and Chinese systems formulated
two distinct models of social development, each of which in
its main features was claimed to have universal validity.
These formulations have provided the central issues of the
Sino-Soviet conflict.
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The general conflict in Sino-Soviet relations result
ing from application of these two developmental models has
many forms and nuances; here it is sufficient to point out
two significant aspects*

First, the Chinese developmental

model obviously challenges the legitimacy of dominant Soviet
elites.

Second, while the Chinese development of the produc

tive forces is undeniably impressive,

application of the Mao

ist developmental model has weakened the Chinese political
system vis-a-vis the external world of crucial points.

That

weakening renders China vulnerable to the political and mili
tary power of the Soviet elites challenged by Mao.

The new

politics of coalition formation since 1970 can be seen to
follow directly from those aspects of Sino-Soviet relations
that are tied to developmental theory.

Soviet and Chinese

political elites explicitly view each other as constituting
a greater threat for the short-run than does the leading
16
capitalist power.
Here we must look to the actual development of
social structure in the two systems and the accompanying
ideological development.

In the Soviet case, both the over

whelming bureaucratization of Soviet society and the party’s
ideological pronouncements point toward powerful and growing
conservative tendencies.

For the foreseeable future,

Soviet

political elites must necessarily view the revolutionary
16

I. Alexeyev, "Anti-Sovietism in Peking's Strategy,"
International Affairs 7 (July 1973)t21-23.
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thrust of Maoism as posing a severe potential threat to their
conservative dominance.
More importantly, account must he taken of the real
practical consequences of Mao's revolution for Chinese soci
ety.

Maoism has provided the energizing goal-culture of the

Chinese revolution;^ that revolution has produced internal
changes in social structure and social relationships far
surpassing the internal changes in social structure and
social relationships far surpassing the internal changes
wrought by the French Revolution.

Since

this is the case,

Mao's successors could carry out an overt renunciation and
reversal of Maoism only at the probable cost of serious
domestic upheavals which would further weaken China vis-avis the external world.

And this appears to be the price

demanded by the Soviets for a resumption of fraternal social
ist ties.
Temporary stabilization of Sino-Soviet relations,
including the resolution of boundary disputes and peripheral
issues, certainly cannot be ruled out.

But resolution of

the broader issues discussed above poses problems of much
greater difficulty and complexity.

For the foreseeable

future, it seems likely that both Soviet and Chinese politi
cal elites will find a continuation of existing tensions to
be less of a threat to internal control and cohesion than a
resolution of their ideological conflict.
17
(Stanfords

Chalmers Johnson, Change in Communist Systems
Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 6-7 .
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CHAPTER III
SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KOREAN
PENINSULA AND NORTHEAST ASIAN POLITICS
During the 1970s, Sino-Soviet relations changed very
little:

the entire ten years saw continued military confron

tation, diplomatic encirclement and counterencirclement,
ideological estrangement, and the atrophy of economic ties.
In contrast, all around the two countries,

and throughout the

globe, the character of political and economic relations
changed more in this decade than in any other period in the
last two centuries.

How did China and the Soviet Union so

successfully insulate their relationship from the immense
shift that occurred everywhere else?

Alternatively,

are

important shifts in intra-communist relations about to occur
in response to the cumulative effect of recent changes?
answer is important,

The

for relations between Moscow and Beijing

form one leg of the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle
that occupies the center of international relations and
vitally affects the foreign policies of all Asian countries,
even in Western states.
The ten years from 1969 to 1979 began with the two
communist giants in Asia at military confrontations.

Follow

ing a series of small scale but symbolically important border
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clashes in the spring and summer of 1969* the Russians had
coerced the Chinese into agreeing to several arms control
measures along the border and to reopening the long-suspended
border talks.

Moscow followed that up with a large military

deployment that upset even further the balance between the
two antagonists, panicked Beijing into thinking that war was
around the corner, and drove the Chinese into the hands of
their previously most hated enemies, Japan and America.
Through the decade, Soviet military superiority was
so great in Beijing’s eyes that even the death of Mao Tsetung whose personal anti-Sovietism was the most important
factor in the decline of Sino-Soviet relations did not immed
iately free his successors to renew discussions even for an
interim settlement, lest the Kremlin drive too hard a bar18
gain.
Indeed, although the threat of imminent war had
passed by mid-decade,

China still felt the need to continue

its insurance policies in Washington by striving to construct
an all-around global anti-Soviet coalition.

The result,

thanks to Chinese persistence, perceived Soviet expansionism,
and Japanese and American cooperation, was restoration of a
diplomatic balance.

This paid dividends in 1979 when China

turned military upon its old Vietnamese ally— now solidly
linked with the Soviet Union--to prevent it from becoming the
18

Solomon, Aslan Security in the 1980s. pp. A6-52.
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dominant force in Southeast Asia,
where they had started*

So things ended about

Moscow and Beijing still faced each

other across a long, heavily armed, and hostile border and
each 'continued to mortgage too much of its overall foreign
policy to the struggle against the other.
The end of the decade did, however, differ from the
beginning in several regards.

Perhaps most importantly,

decision makers in both Moscow and Beijing were sensitized,
by the three occasions of Sino-Soviet war or near war, to
the ultimate need for a modus vivendi.

In this regard, the

Vietnam crisis of 1979 was more important that the two mili
tary confrontations earlier in the decade, because only in
this case did both the Soviet and the Chinese leaderships
face the possibility of large-scale war and uncontrollable
escalation.

19

Secondly, the character of Asian international

relations had changed enormously.

Thirdly, the overall

international system, both political and economic, had
undergone great modifications that have influenced all
actors,

including Moscow and Beijing.

Finally, the Soviet

and Chinese societies have each gone through important evo
lutions in the intervening years, with the result that the
domestic motivations of their respective foreign policies,
toward each other and in general, had increasingly shifted
direction.
19
'C.G. Jacobsen, Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao:
The Chairman* s Legacy (New York*
Praeger Publishers, 1981,
pp. 96-103.
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With the possible exception of the 19^0s, Asia
changed more in the 1970s than during any other decade in
the last two centuries.

The most important development has

been the emergence of six modern, rapidly growing, capital
ist, developed states or city-states along the eastern peri
phery of the continent.

Stretching from South Korea in the

north through Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore,

and Malay

sia in the south, these states have set the economic pace for
Asia as a whole, are economic models for other developing
states in Asia and elsewhere, constitute a grouping whose
size and common interests rival those of the European com
munities, and exert an increasingly strong pull on the cen
trally planned, but slower growing, communist economies on
the Asian land mass.

Both Russia and China feel themselves

caught in the dynamic field of these states' economic pro
gress,

so that much of the Sino-Soviet rivalry during the

decade has taken the form of competitive economic appeals to
Japan, rivalry as to who could better assist the North Kor
eans in keeping up economically with the South Koreans, and
attempts to profit from the economic growth of noncommunist
Southeast Asia.

20

If the Sino-Soviet conflict had not been so acute,
the Chinese would have been overjoyed at this prospect, for
it represented the fulfillment of one of their major policy
20

A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in
East Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
pp. 130-132.
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goals, often enunciated since 1949.

However, the Chinese

were so fearful of the Soviet military threat that even they
had to join the chorus of Asian statemen calling upon the
new American president to come back to his policy senses.

21

By the end of the decade, these cries, and those of many for
eign policy analysts within the United States,
have been heard,

seemed to

for the United States began to renew its

interest and activism in Asia.

To be sure, much of the

resurgence in American policy attention to Asia was the pro
duct of the desire to use the new Chinese connection for
anti-Soviet purposes or to claim that too much had been
solved through Sino-American normalization.

But much of it

also derived from the belated realization that Asia had be
come the United States' greatest trading partner,

that Asia

still was a cockpit of global conflict, that only in north
east Asia did Soviet-American-Chinese and Japanese interests
geographically coalesce.

22

The third major change in Asian international rela
tions in the 1970s was the parallel emergence of China and
Japan into policy activism.

The causes of this activism

were, of course, quite different.

In the Japanese case,

they were almost entirely economic.

What influence Tokyo

gained in Beijing and Moscow derived almost exclusively from
its large gross national product,
^Ibid,,
22

its high rate of growth,

pp. 134-136.

Solomon, Asian Security in the 1980s. pp. 109-113.
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its foreign trade dynamism,

and its capacity to export tech

nology to anyone who could pay the right fee.

In the Chinese

case, the reasons were almost entirely political.
Cultural Revolution,

During the

China had isolated itself virtually com

pletely from the external world; a large part of Beijing's
diplomatic activity was therefore an attempt to restore China
to its self-perceived natural place at the center of the
Asian international order.
These Japanese and Chinese developments meant that,
for the first time in modern history, the two most important
Asian states were actively engaged in the region and were
friendly toward each other.

The character of Asian interna

tional relations was, therefore,

unprecedented.

These

changes also accentuated continued American involvement and
increasing Soviet activism.

It was, in fact, expansion of

Soviet involvement in Asia and the possibility of a Soviet
strategic breakout from its traditional position of geogra
phic isolation from Asia that threatened permanently to up21
set the Asian balance of power. J

This constituted the fourth

major change in Asia during the 1970s.
. Historically,

the very geography of Asia, the neces

sity for Moscow to devote its still limited resources to
Europe,

and the weakness of the Soviet Union at home had

combined to keep Russia out of any but peripheral involvement
in Asian politics.
23

Jacobsen,

But by the mid-1970s

Soviet society was

Sino-Soviet Relations, pp. 125- 132.
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clearly stable and reasonably strong.

Moreover, the Soviet

military build-up had gone far enough that Moscow could
increasingly invest in building up its strength in Siberia.
Indeed, the need to deter perceived irrational Chinese actions
along the Chinese border merely accelerated what had already
become a clearly perceived policy goal.
There were many manifestations of this new Soviet
activism.

Even by the beginning of the decade, Moscow had

become the only external power of consequence in South
24
Asia.
Following the end of the Vietnam Alar, it was Moscow
that wrestled with Beijing over who was to be the most impor
tant extra-regional power in Southeast Asia.

The Soviet

naval and air build-up in Northeast Asia was largely respon
sible for the Japanese decision to draw perceptibly closer
to China, to build-up its own military force, and to renew
pressure on the United States to continue its own military
presence.
One immediate result of this new Soviet policy was
to replace Asian lines of tension that generally went east
and west, and between communist and noncommunist societies,
between one communist state and another.

Once the Vietnam

War was past, all conflicts in Asia in the decade involved
communist military forces on both sides of the battle line.
Vietnam invaded Cambodia.

China invaded Vietnam.

^Ibid., pp. 140-142.

The Soviet
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Union threatened China with immense harm.

Moreover, the

traditional flashpoints between communist and noncommunist
countries dropped below the kindling point, at least tempor
arily.

There was no new north-south war in Korea.

The

intra-communist wars were based materially on a liberal
supply of Soviet armaments.
flict in Asia was due

The decline in East-West con

principally to the combination of

these internecine communist conflicts and the rise of American-Japanese assisted local powers— South Korea, Taiwan,
and the countries of the Association of South-East-Asian
Nations (ASEAN).
At present,
would persist.

it is not clear how long this new Asia

Everything depended upon continuation

2S
^mo-Soviet enmity. J

of

And despite the wars and threats of

wars in 1979> the scare resulting from the Sino-Soviet con
frontation over Vietnam motivated policy-makers in both cap
itals to return to their policy senses far enough to engage
jointly in a new search for peace.
A final Asian trend vitally affecting Soviet-Chinese relations in the 1970s has just been alluded to, namely,
the rapid growth in status of regional powers.
Asia,
wan.

In Northeast

the most startling examples were South Korea and Tai-

26

Their economic influence was felt throughout the

^-^Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Dispute:
An Analy
sis of the Polemics (Cranburys
Associated University
Presses, Inc., 1976)* pp. 16-2 1 .
26
Solomon, Asian Security in the 1980s . pp. 122- 12^.
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Western world and even penetrated the Middle East.

Each con

structed a military force increasingly representative of its
new economic power.

Despite their need for continued high-

technology American assistance, their own efforts were
largely sufficient to deter attack from their very heavily
armed communist antagonists.

In Southeast Asia, the same

role was played by the newly reunited Vietnam state, with the
obvious difference that Vietnam's strength derived almost
entirely from its military success and was bought at high
cost in economic hardship and popular distress.

It was the

military stalwartness of the Vietnamese that made it possi
ble to reunite all of Indochina under one rule, and it was
this reunification that,

in turn, upset the delicate commun-

ist-noncommunist military balance in Southeast Asia as a
whole.
Amidst all of these major changes,

it is startling

that Soviet-Chmese relations remained so stable.

27

One

reason surely was that both Moscow and Beijing were afraid
that the very rapidity of these changes could work to the
advantage of the other side.

Hence,

their reaction was to

continue the status quo in Sino-Soviet relations and to deal
with external problems as they arose.

Another reason was

that, with Soviet-Chinese relations reduced to military con
frontation and conflict too severe even to contemplate,

a

reasonable strategy for both was to do battle against the
27Ibid., pp. 152-154.
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other indirectly.

This meant supporting one or another of

the antagonists in war, or, to the extent possible,

standing

on opposite sides of the nonmilitary trends in the regions
just noted.

Other reasons for Soviet-Chinese stability stem

from the changing character of the international system and
the evolution of events in China and the Soviet Union.

Suf

fice it to say here that if all of these factors resulted in
temporary stability in Soviet-Chinese relations, once the
effects of these changes have been absorbed, Moscow and Bei
jing may conclude that the time is ripe for addressing,

and

then solving on their merits, the whole range of differences
that have separated them for more than two decades.
The 1970s also saw changes in the general interna
tional system that were more revolutionary than in any of
the decades of the 20th Century,

save perhaps those associ

ated with the two world wars, and surely held more potential
for further change than any single decade in two centuries.
Moreover,

as in Asia,

it was all that China and the Soviet

Union could do to keep up with these changes and their
pQ
effects on their respective societies and foreign policies.
Again, the apparent stability in Soviet-Chinese relations
may be both artificial and temporary,

depending among other

factors whether the rapidity of international systemic
changes will now diminish, whether the two societies can

28

Gary K. Bertsch, et al., Comparative Communism:
The Soviet. Chinese, and Yugoslav Models (San Francisco:
W.R. Freeman and Company, 1976), pp. A 1-A5 .
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successfully grapple with the changes, and whether those
changes themselves will at last vitally affect the futures
of Moscow and Beijing.
Changes in the international system in the 1970s can
be summarized by noting the effects of five trends.

The

most important was continued dominance of the international
system by military competition between the United States and
the Soviet Union.

This imparted to the system a residual

bipolarism that influenced all issues and trends.

i/tfhat

changed, of course, was the rise in raw power of the Soviet
Union and the relative decline of that of the United States.
By the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union had clearly drawn
abreast of the United States in overall military strength
and threatened American dominance in other measures of power
as w e l l . ^
Certainly the 1980s could witness a period of overall
Soviet military superiority, however temporary that might
prove to be.

Never mind why the Soviet Union chooses to pay

such a high price in terms of overall development to assure
conventional and strategic equality/superiority with, or
over, the United S t a t e s . ^

The point is that the Soviet

Union built itself up militarily partly as a means of deter
ring the Chinese and partly to achieve overall equality with
the United States.
29
^Solomon, Asian Security in the 1980s. pp. 10-1 1 .
3°Xbid., p. 11.
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This implies that Moscow perceived it to be neces
sary to possess greater military strength than the armaments
likely to be arrayed against it by America and China at the
same time.-^1

Thus, the criticalness for global military

stability of Sino-Soviet relations has risen steeply in
recent years merely because of the changed military equation
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Equally important, this new American-Soviet military
relationship severely modified,

if not totally overcame,

the

effects of four other international trends during the 1970s.
One of these was the replacement of Cold War, East-West
enmity with a somewhat more relaxed feeling of cooperation
and even harmony in many spheres.

As many Cold War barriers

came down, it became possible to think of East-West relations
based on trade,

cultural exchange, the flow of mutually bene

ficial ideas, and attack upon common global problems.

These

currents obviously influenced the Soviet Union more than
32
China,
although the degree of penetration of Western ideas
still seemed superficial and was always subject to the con
trol of Soviet authorities.

As for China, only after Mao's

death did Beijing even begin to open itself to renewed West
ern influence; after several years it was still not clear
31

C.L. Sulzberger, The Coldest Wart
Russia's Game
in China (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1974),
pp. 60-6 6 .
32
J R, Keesing, The Sino-Soviet Dispute
Charles Scribner's Son^I 1969)» pp. 93-96.

(New York:
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whether the modernization-related changes which the new
Chinese leadership was attempting to carry out would not he
reversed after a short period of experimentation.
There was one beneficial influence of the major
changes in the international system during the 1970s i in
both the Soviet and Chinese cases, the classical LeninistMarxist bifurcation of every aspect of international rela
tions into mutually antagonistic Eastern and Western com
ponents was modified if not entirely set aside.

Neither

Moscow nor Beijing felt itself threatened from all sides by
a predatory capitalist world.

Indeed, both strongly inter

acted with, and grew in many regards to admire,

the West,

thus lessening the need to stand together in an unfriendly
world.

Conversely, the decline in perceived ideological

pressure from the outside meant that both communist giants
could pay more attention to solving their respective domes
tic problems and conducting bilateral political battles.
Thus, paradoxically,

the slackening of tensions between East

and West became a precondition for exacerbating, over the
short-run, tensions between the two most important communist
countries.
Whatever the reality, the Soviet Union and China
looked upon interdependence with envy, not merely because
socialist societies and economies are by nature autarkic,
but more importantly because the socialist world was largely
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left out of these exciting developments.*^

To be left aside

was to be left behind, and Russia and China, each in its own
way,

sought to gain the benefits of interdependence while

minimizing the costs associated with the dismantling of
autarky.

Moscow and Beijing were like moths circling an

attractive but clearly destructive flame.
Were it to become the dominant mode of communist
dealings with the West, interdependence could lead to irre
versible changes in Soviet and Chinese attitudes and policies
toward the United States, Europe, and Japan.

Further, were

it ever decided that East-West cooperation rather than allout competition was best, little would be left of the ideo
logical imperative to overthrow capitalism by force.

Com

munists in Moscow and Beijing could then think in realistic
and favorable terms about convergence,

and of socialism and

capitalism as alternative and not necessarily antagonistic
means of modernization.

Thus, a little bit of East-West

interdependence would go a long way toward preventing recon
stitution of joint Sino-Soviet ideological opposition to the
outside world.
By the end of the 1970s, the question for SinoSoviet relations was how the influence of these new aspects
of the Asian subsystem would affect the military rivalry
between the two.

Soviet-Chinese relations ought to have

-^George Gmsburgs, et al., The Sino-Soviet Terri
torial Dispute. 1949-64 (New York:
Praeger Publishers,
1978), pp. 48-55-

l±lJ,

been modified by these factors as much as they changed the
character of international relations.

Obviously, a major

portion of the answer must be traced to the dominant weight
of the military factor.

Nhen two enormous and powerful

countries share a very long border and have a falling out
. .
.
3A
that leads eventually to military confrontation,
every
thing else becomes secondary in importance.
does not explain all.

Still, that

An additional, important,and continu

ing element is the propensity of both communist states to
insulate their problems from outside scrutiny and influence.
The Sino-Soviet dispute began as an internecine ideological
dispute and has retained elements of an argument between
believers within one fold.

It is true that, as differences

became more serious and as both states began to fear the
worst from the other, each looked to the outside for assis
tance against the other.

That call has gone farther in the

case of the Chinese who, being the weaker

party, must natur

ally seek allies wherever they can be found.

Nonetheless,

it is startling how little Moscow and Beijing have allowed
their conflict to modify their respective policies toward
other countries when that modification is measured

in terms

of actual expenditure of resources.
It is true that mutual problems and fears have
J 0. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: The Great Game
(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. A67-A7 1 .
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severely warped both Moscow’s and Beijing's otherwise natural
1<
.
policy of opposition to the West.
But it is remarkable
how little irreversible change in the relationship has occur
red as a consequence of the factors mentioned above.

How

long this relative insulation of Soviet-Chinese problems from
these other, changing, aspects of the international system
can continue is unclear.

But so long as both Russia and

China are reasonably self-sufficient economically and so long
as their respective communist parties continue to place the
highest value on ideological, economic,
autarky,

and sociological

it is likely that the influence of changes in the

international system on Sino-Soviet relations will not be
gre a t .
Perhaps the 1980s will finally see international
systemic factors breaking through the dike set up by the
militarization of Sino-Soviet relations and the still suc
cessful attempt to insulate their differences from outside
influence.

It is more likely, however, that restoration of

reasonably good Sino-Soviet relations will strengthen fur
ther the propensity in both communist capitals to address
their common problems in isolation from the rest of the
world.

Conversely, restoration of a measure of Soviet-Chin-

ese harmony would itself be of such great importance to the
Asian subsystem that these other factors would,
undergo severe modification.
35Ibid., p. iP73.

in turn,

What their revised effect on
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Moscow-Beijing relations under such circumstances would be
is impossible to say.
In the 1970s, major changes occurred in China and
the Soviet Union,

some of which affected the course of Sino-

Soviet relations.

The death of Mao Tse-tung, the reversal

of many of his policies, and the new emphasis upon moderni
zation all seemed to enhance prospects for changes in Chinese
foreign policy favorable to bettering Sino-Soviet ties.
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After all, it was Mao himself who often singlehandedly kept
China on the path of stringent anti-Sovietism.

His departure,

along with the arrest or decline of his erstwhile followers,
removed one impediment to eventual rapprochement with Moscow.
Indeed, were it not for the Soviet military threat and the
comparatively greater economic attractiveness of China to
the West, it is likely that Soviet-Chinese relations would
already have improved.

To be sure, domestic changes do not

always give rise to corresponding changes in foreign policy.
But in the past the general character and direction of devel
opments inside China were closely associated with, and usual
ly led, changes in Chinese foreign policy.
The mere fact of momentum in Chinese foreign policy
was also responsible for the nonevolutionary character over
the short-term of Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union.
-^Drew Middleton, The Duel of the Giants; China and
Russia in Asia (New Yorks
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978),
pp. 55-59.
%

^^Ibid., p. 6 3 .

^7

Such unfinished business as completing normalization with
the United States, establishing a solid working relationship
with Japan, and demonstrating China's status as a regional
power in Southeast Asia all had to be taken care of before
Beijing felt itself strong enough to approach negotiations
with Moscow on the basis of reasonable equality.

The domes

tic requisite for many of these foreign policy changes was
the strengthening of the country economically; that is what
China after 1976 began in earnest.
The Chinese modernization drive will affect SinoSoviet relations in three ways.

Firstly, China will even

tually decide it is strong enough to drive a more equal bar
gain with Moscow.

Secondly, economic modernization will

inevitably change the character of Chinese socialist society
to look more and more like Soviet socialist society.

At some

point, bureaucratic authoritarianism will come to dominate
China just as it has the Soviet Union.

Thirdly,

successful

modernization will allow the domestic pragmatists to speak:
out on foreign policy issues from a stronger power base.

The

probability is strong that they will favor melioration of
relations with Moscow.
If there have been several important changes in China
relevant to Sino-Soviet relations,
the Soviet Union.

such was not the case in

Down to mid-1979, there have been no major

changes, no reversals of course economically,

and no swift

modification of the character of Soviet society.

Things
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always move slowly in Moscow and elsewhere in the Soviet
Union.

Nonetheless, two domestic trends seem relevant to

Soviet policies toward China.

One is the increasing ideolo

gical conservatism of the Moscow leadership.

Depending on

how one views Mao's own ideological pretensions and how his
successors changed Beijing's ideological emphasis,

such

Soviet conservatism may cause the Kremlin to be somewhat more
sympathetic to the Chinese world outlook than previously.
Mao was a radical, utopian visionary.
tainly are not.

His successors cer

They are pragmatic and decisively uninter

ested over the short-term in diverting many Chinese resources
to furthering revolutionary communism throughout the world.^
Their interest is in building up China economically and mili
tarily.

These are nearly the same goals as the Soviet lead

ership sets for Russia, the only difference being that Moscow
has more power to apply to foreign policy than does Beijing.
But as the Soviet moves further along in the national process
of ideological ossification,

and as the value of the Soviet

industrial plant steadily increases,

so also does the Soviet

leadership's propensity to go more slowly in foreign policy
ventures.
The other domestic Soviet trend is the rapidly
increasing bureaucratization of Soviet society.
-^Griffith,

This has

Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 155-157-

k9
a double effect on Soviet foreign policy.
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Firstly,

it

makes it ever more, difficult for the Kremlin to carry out
foreign policy initiatives.

Secondly, it brings an increase

in tension between populace and government that will give
added impetus to any Soviet leadership to clear away problems
with Beijing.

This is not to say that the Kremlin is anxious

to compromise its policies toward Beijing merely to address
domestic problems.

The history of Sino-Soviet relations dur

ing the last decade indicates that Moscow would like to
improve relations with Beijing for foreign policy reasons
40
alone.
But as these domestic Soviet trends become increas
ingly important, the pressure to try for a modus vivendi with
the Chinese will surely increase.
In sum, the influence on Sino-Soviet relations of
domestic forces and trends in the' Soviet Union and China is
clear.

Domestic concerns drive Moscow and Beijing to look

with ever greater favor on improving relations with the other,
or at least not worsening relations.

Kence, for the first

time since Mao's death in 1976, domestic trends in the two
countries point their foreign policies in the same direction.
The Kremlin has relatively greater control over its own domes
tic fate and hence can better

modulate the effects of domes

tic factors on its policy toward China.

China oscillates in

39It>id., p. 159.
l\,0, .
Middleton, Duel of the Giants, pp. 223-?229.
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its foreign policy largely due to policy variations at home.
Moreover,

China's foreign policy

tends to change faster

than that of the Soviet Union and is thus affected more
rapidly.

In a statistical sense, this means that domestic

Chinese conditions favoring improved Sino-Soviet relations
are likely to appear periodically.
It is well to remind ourselves of these recent events
and then to consider Soviet and Chinese strategies as they
conduct their negotiations.

The years 1978 and 1979 saw a

rapid development of events that brought the two countries
to the brink of war-.

The sequence is well-known.

In early

1978, Moscow failed to achieve a breakthrough in its economic
sind political relations with Tokyo.

This, combined with Jap

anese perceptions of a greater Soviet military threat and
Chinese promises of a vast improvement in Sino-Japanese eco
nomic relations, drove Tokyo into the arms of Beijing.
Therefore, the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty was signed,
which was correctly interpreted as an anti-Soviet move on
Tokyo's part and which formed one leg of what the USSR per
ceived as an emerging and hostile American-Chinese-Japanese
cooperative relationship.

Moscow struck back by signing a

treaty of alliance with Vietnam which was not only anti-Chin
ese but which permitted Vietnam,

in Moscow's eyes, to invade

Cambodia without fear of a Chinese military response which
it could not handle.
But China was constrained by geography and its own
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military backwardness to limit its incursion in Vietnam and
could go no further than the edges of the Red River Delta
Plain.

More importantly,

Beijing directly felt the pressure

of Soviet maneuvers along the Sino-Soviet border, and, al
though no conclusive documentary evidence is yet available,
the USSR likely conveyed threats to take direct action against
China.

China wisely stepped back from the brink of war by

claiming that it had achieved its goals in Vietnam and with
drawing.

It then seized upon the occasion of the expiration

of the old 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty to suggest that the two
states begin the process in earnest of working out a new
relationship.

It took the catharsis of confrontation to

bring the Chinese to the realization that a further deterior
ation in relations with the Soviet Union could lead to a
spiralling conflict that could only end in nuclear war.

It

was this catharsis, then, combined with the broader trends
noted above, that initiated the slow process of improvement
of relations between China and the Soviet Union.
Other considerations pointed in the same direction.
On the Chinese side, three elements emerged in mid-1979»
For one, China by then had restored close ties with Japan
and the United States and looked forward to similar success
with India.

This would take care of three of the four major

powers on China's periphery, thus olearing the decks for a
direct approach to Moscow.

Secondly, there was an objective

need to replace the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty with some other.
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instrument, statement, or understanding that would define
Moscow-Beijing relations.

In the wake of the Soviet-Viet-

namese crisis in 1979* the Chinese had formally given notice
of their intention to allow the treaty to expire according
to its one-year denunciatory clause.

Now some in Beijing

felt, not unreasonably, that the time had come to place
Sino-Soviet relations on a more realistic formal basis.

The

evidence indicates that this argument was raised in high
policy meetings during the spring of 1979*

Finally, by

early 1979» it had become clear that the Chinese moderniza
tion program was not only too ambitious but that, even with
severe reductions in the scope of the four modernizations,
Beijing would need to look to all suppliers of technology
and capital if it were to succeed.

Obviously,

this would

include the Soviet Union who was a major supplier to China
during the 1950s.

In sum, China was driven by the necessi

ties of diplomacy and economics to look more favorably upon
improving relations with the Soviet.
From the very beginning of its dispute with China,
the Soviet Union had offered to compromise their several
disputes.

But in each instance,

Soviet policy and style was

to complement such offers with safeguards to its own secur
ity, that is, the snapping of economic relations,
to isolate China diplomatically,

the attempt

ideologically, and geogra

phically, and the enormous overgarrisoning of its border with
China.
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Major impediments might render this process stillborn.

One is Korea.

l± l

. .

For years, Moscow and Beijing have

competed for influence in Pyongyang, one result of which was
North Korea's major military build-up.

This threatened South

Korea and made difficult any real progress toward solution of
the Korean issue.
Soviet relations,

However, with a positive turn in Sinoaccompanied in all probability by continued

downward movement in Soviet-American relations and a halt in
improvement of ties between China and America,

important

obstacles impeding joint Soviet-Chinese support for North
Korea would be removed.

Thus, Korea would not likely be a

problem were Moscow and Beijing to meliorate their own rela
tions.

The probability of a negotiated solution to the

Korean problem might decline therewith and the prospects for
war on the peninsula might even increase.

The point, how

ever, is that nothing in the Moscow-Pyongyang-Beijing tri
angle makes it impossible for the two communist giants to
cooperate with each other (and with Pyongyang) rather than
to compete for influence m

the North.

Ll2

The most important aspect of a general agreement
would be settlement of the military and border issue, the
impediment to improved Sino-Soviet ties.

Settlement of that

problem would, of course, pose a serious threat for the
United States, for thereafter both Moscow and Beijing could
41
42

Solomon, Asian Security in the 1980s. p. 110.

Ibid.

5^

concentrate resources and attention in different areas and
not dissipate their energies in fratricidal competition
across their common frontier and around each other's peri
pheries.

This possibility is made all the more real once

the border question is considered directly.

It has been

clear for many years that, as mentioned above, the border
problem is solvable on its merits at any moment.

The real

problem is not the border as such but the military imbalance
in favor of the Soviet Union and the high concentration of
forces on both sides of the boundary.

As the years go by,

China's military strength can only increase; and although
in the foreseeable future it is not likely to equal that of
the Soviet Union, the relative imbalance could right itself
as China invests in new military technology and imports upto-date weapons systems from the West.

Thus,

short-term

improvement in Chinese military ties with Europe and Amer
ica could,

in the long-run,

enhance

prospects for resolving

the military stand-off between Moscow and Beijing.
for the first time since 1959* Beijing,

Indeed,

as well as Moscow,

may seriously be attempting to resolve this issue, the most
important Sino-Soviet difference.

With Mao gone and the

1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty no more, Beijing may have decided
that the time is ripe to approach Moscow to work out a fresh
start.
Since 1950» the Soviet Union has found Asia an
increasingly difficult region to penetrate.

One after
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another, countries that historically were weak increased
dramatically in strength.

The way was led by China and

all other states of Northeast Asia followed.

In each case,

the Soviet Union found it harder and harder to exert its
influence until, in most cases,

it was physically excluded

and could conduct only a military policy from within its
own borders or in international waters or air space.
then turned to South and Southeast Asia where,

It

thanks to

the volatility of the situation and the weakness of the
indigenous states,

it was at least partly successful.

But,

by the end of the 1970s, those regions also saw strong
governments replacing weak ones.

Here also, therefore,

Moscow found it increasingly difficult to exert its influ
ence.

It had to depend on chance opportunities presented

by regional conflicts or internal revolution to continue
and, sometimes,

to extend its operations.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND
ITS IMPACT ON NORTH KOREA
Pendulum of the North Korean Exercise Between
Beijing and Moscow
The super powers have been relatively free to shape
their policies toward one another, but each has sought to
win the support of its allies for major moves affecting
world tensions.

North and South Korea, by contrast, would

appear to be much more constrained by dependence on outside
allies than the larger powers.

Thus,

some South Koreans

have argued that Koreans have become accustomed to think
ing that their division was a result of the East-West Cold
War, because— at least in the 1950s and 1960s--opposition
from the great powers could have made unification impossi
ble.

Others hold that, even in the 1970s, the prospects

of North-South rapprochement depend on East-West detente.
The regime of Kim Il-Sung, on the other hand,
emphasizing self-identity and self-reliance (chu che) at
least since 1955» has pursued a rather autonomous course,
either ignoring Russian and Chinese preferences or playing
them off against each other.

Despite these tactics, the

North Koreans have enjoyed considerable support from Moscow
or Beijing or from both over the years, though the magnitude
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of foreign assistance to the Republic of Korea has been
even greater.

Relations between Pyongyang and Moscow cooled

after 1962, following the Cuban missile retreat and the
Soviet stand on the Sino-Indian frontier disputes.
ing Kosygin's February,

Follow

1965* visit to North Korea, however,

Soviet assistance resumed again, though Moscow seems to have
been concerned in 1968 and 1969 lest the Pueblo and EC-121
incidents lead to a major United States-North Korea confron
tation.

North Korea's relations with PRC deteriorated in

the mid-1960s,

tensions mounting during PRC's Cultural Revo

lution to the point that Red Guards put up wall posters in
Beijing calling Kim II-Sung a "counterrevolutionary revi
sionist" as well as a "millionaire,
leading bourgeois element in Korea."

an aristocrat, and a
In 1968-1969t border

clashes were reported between Chinese and.North Korean
forces, amid signs that Beijing wanted territorial "compen
sation" for the intervention of its "volunteers" in the
Korean War.

By 1969-1970, however, Chinese-North Korean

relations had turned dramatically for the better.

Beijing

signed a five-year aid agreement with the North Koreans and
quietly dropped its claim to a 100-square mile strip of
North Korean territory bordering Manchuria.

In November,

1970, Kim II-Sung took the occasion of the Fifth Congress
of the Korean Workers Party to assert that "revisionism" had
appeared in the international communist movement and ob
structed its unity and cohesion,

causing ideological confu
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sion.

Without harming the Soviet Union directly, Kim criti

cized revisionism for obscuring the line of demarcation
between friend and foe, yielding to United States' imperial
ism, scared at its policy of nuclear blackmail,

and casting

sheep's eyes at the imperialists while playing lip-service
to an anti-imperialist position.

After hearing these and

other oblique attacks on the USSR, the party congress affirm
ed the North Korea's independent line.
Friendly relations between North Korea and PRC were
restored after the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April,

1969#

which marked the end of the most intense phase of the Cul
tural Revolution.

As the Cultural Revolution in China drew

to a close at the end of 1969i Beijing apparently decided
to relax its policy of self-imposed isolation and attempted
to reestablish normal political relations with selected
countries,

including North Korea.

The North Korean Com

munists once again seemed to feel that they had leaned too
far in one direction.

There were some indications that

Soviet economic help had not been as abundant as anticipated
and that Pyongyang wanted to build a military and economic
base more independent of Moscow.

A major factor contribu

ting to the revival of Pyongyang-Beijing friendship was
their shared hostility toward Japan and their increased fear
of Japan's growing strength.

During 1969 and 1970, two sig

nificant developments seemed to forerun a larger future role
for the Japanese in Asian security arrangements, reinforcing

59
North Korean fears.

First was the Nixon Doctrine announced

in November,

1969, which implicitly urged a more positive
A3
Japanese role in the maintenance of the Asian security. ^
Second was the Nixon-Sato joint communique in which Premier
Sato stated that the maintenance of peace and security in
the Taiwan area was . . . a most important factor for the
security of Japan and that "the security of the Republic of
Korea was essential to Japan*s own security."

AA

Speaking

at the National Press Club in Washington, the Premier reem
phasized the importance of Korea to Japan's security.
The main turning point in Sino-North Korean relations
probably was Premier Chou En-lai's visit to North Korea dur
ing April,

1970.

Kis visit was the first by a top-level

Chinese official since President Liu Shao-chi visited North
Korea in 1963*

Chou's speech, delivered upon his arrival at

the Pyongyang airport,

clearly conveyed Beijing's desire to

restore friendly relations with North Korea.
blood-cemented militant friendship,

Chou said:

Recalling their
"China and

Korea are neighbors as closely related as lips and teeth,
and our two peoples are intimate b r o t h e r s . D u r i n g his
A3
-'Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Wash
ington:
The Brookings Institution, 1975)» pp. 2-5*
AA
The New York Times. November 22, 1969* pp. 1 and
1^? United States Foreign Policy. 1969-1970 (Washington,
D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 5C3“5°5‘
^ The New York Times. 7 and 8 April 1970; Far Eastern
Economic Review. April 11, 1970, pp. 33-3A.
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visit, Chou loudly denounced U.S.-Japanese collusion and,
probably out of consideration for his hosts, avoided public
attacks on the Soviet Union.
Sino-North Korean contacts, which had withered since
1965, resumed after late 1968.

In February,

1970, a new

North Korean ambassador was sent to Beijing, and a new Chin
ese ambassador took up his North Korean post on March 23,
1970.

In November,

1970, Beijing, reportedly dropped its

long-standing claim for cession of a hundred-square mile
strip of North Korean territory around Mt. Faektu.

A6

Beijing

initially made the demand in 1965 when North Korea drifted to
the Soviet camp.
As Sino-North Korean relations improved considerably
after late 1969, North Korea's relations with Moscow cooled
somewhat.

However,

it should be emphasized that North Korea

did not intend to break away from Moscow as she had done in
1962.

Pyongyang relations with Moscow slipped in the wake

of the downing of an EC-121 American intelligence aircraft
on April 15, 1969*

While China promptly praised North Korea,

the Soviet Union waited three days to endorse the North
Korean attack, and Soviet ships joined the U.S. Navy in the
search for possible survivors.

lLr7

President Nikolai Podgor-

ney's visit to North Korea the following month probably was
A6

The New York Times. 23 November 1970, PP« 6-9-

A7
'B.C. Koh, "Dilemmas of Korean Reunification,"
Asian Survey XI (May 1971)*A8 6 .
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designed to restrain Pyongyang's excessively bellicose pos
ture.

The Soviet reaction to the EC-121 incident did not

please North Korea.
While in Pyongyang, Podgorny attempted to gain North
Korean support for Moscow's position concerning the SinoSoviet border dispute of 1969 and to win Pyongyang's parti
cipation in the Moscow conference of world communist parties
the following month.

But North Korea took a neutral posi

tion on the border dispute issue, and the North Koreans
refused to attend the Moscow Conference,
the list of absent parties.

joining China on

A8

Beijing and Pyongyang stood together on two important
issues:

support for Cambodia's ousted chief of state, Prince

Norodom Sihanouk,

and opposition to the revival of Japanese

militarism and aggression.

When Sihanouk formed a govern

ment- in- exile in Beijing early in 1970* China and North
Korea immediately recognized the exile government, while the
Soviet Union continued to recognize Lon Nol's government in
Phnom Penh.

Despite North Korea's veiled criticism of Mos

cow' s insensitivity to growing Japanese militarism, Moscow
continued its friendly gestures toward Tokyo.
The first indication of disagreement between North
Korea and the Soviet Union surfaced publicly when North Korea
1

announced its decision to withdraw from a joint Soviet-North
A8

The New York Times. 11 May 1969, P« 8 ; New York
Times 20 May 1969, p"i 18.
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Korean oceanographic study of the sea of Japan.

'The reason

was Moscow's unilateral decision to include Japanese scien
tists in the research project, which was originally under
taken on the basis of scientific and technological cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang. '
North Korea's deteriorating relations with Moscow
were confirmed at the Fifth Congress of the Korean Worker's
Party held in November,

1969*

In his report to the Congress,

Kim criticized the Soviet Union asserting that revisionism
appeared in the international communist movement and ob
structed its unity and cohesion,

causing ideological confu

sion.
On July 16, 1971» President Richard M. Nixon
announced that he would make an official trip to Beijing
in 1972, and less than three months later, on October 12,
Washington and Moscow announced that Nixon would also visit
the Soviet Union that year.

Nixon's scheduled visits to

both Beijing and Moscow in 1972 undoubtedly caused serious
apprehension in Pyongyang, but North Korea was much more
concerned with the consequences of Nixon's journey to Bei
jing than with his trip to Moscow.

This was perhaps because

the Moscow visit was the less dramatic and unusual by far.
North Korea referred to Nixon's forthcoming Beijing
visit as not the march of a victor but a trip of the defeated.
49

North Korea Leaves Joint Soviet-Korean Oceanogra
phic Project," Radio Free Europe Research (March 1^, 1970):
1-3.
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Although North Korea offered reassurance that Nixon's visit
would not affect Pyongyang's relations with Beijing, the
Korean Worker's Party organ expressed some misgivings and
subtly demanded an acceptable explanation of the trip.--^
North Korea's concern about Washington-Beijing rapproche
ment had some impact on Pyongyang's relationship with Bei
jing.

For example, tbe October 25, 1971* commemoration of

China's entry into the Korean Conflict passed almost unmarked
in each country, m

sharp contrast to 1970.

Realizing North Korea's apprehension over Nixon's
Beijing visit,

Chinese leaders made a considerable effort

to reassure North Korea.

Even before the announcement, Bei

jing proclaimed July 9-15 as Chinese-Korean Friendship
Week.

^2

•

.

.

•

Upon receiving additional economic and military

assistance and assurances from China, Kim II-Sung then
announced that Nixon's China trip would temporarily ease
international tension.

In his statement, Kim again stressed

that Sino-American rapprochement had no direct bearing on
North Korea.

Chou En-lai had apparently succeeded in per

suading Kim II-Sung to accept the new Sino-American rela
tionship.
^°The New York Times, 11 August 1971* P« 5«
<1

J Robert Simmons, "North Korea:
Asian Survey XII (January 1972)i31«
^Ibid.,

pp. 30-3 1 *

Year of the Thaw,"
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North Korea's concern over Nixon's journey to Bei
jing was shared fully by Moscow.
Sino-American rapprochement,

Apparently to counter the

for instance,

Soviet Foreign

Minister Andrei Gromyko suddenly visited Japan just before
President Nixon's visit to Beijing and agreed with Japanese
leaders to open negotiations within 1972 for a JapaneseSoviet peace treaty.

The Soviet Union seemed to use the

situation to strengthen her position in North Korea by pro
viding additional economic and military assistance and ex
changing high-level delegations.

Meanwhile, North Korea

made an effort to utilize the Nixon visit to Beijing to
strengthen its relations with Moscow.

There is no doubt

that Pyongyang became more intimate with Moscow.
As Nixon's visit to Beijing neared, there were
unusually frequent exchange of high-ranking delegations
between Moscow and Pyongyang.

A high-level Soviet delga-

tion, led by Sharaf R. Rashodov, First Secretary of the
Uzbekistan Communist Party, came to Pyongyang, probably to
inform and assure the North Korean's communists about Nixon's
forthcoming Moscow visit.

While in North Korea, Rashodov

made an unusually strong statement in support of Korean
unification under communist leadership.

During the week

prior to Nixon's Beijing visit, the Soviet press accused
Beijing of breaking the solidarity of the communist camp by
receiving President Nixon.

Although North Korea bitterly

criticized the United States, without mentioning Nixon's
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arrival in Beijing, the North Korean's shied away from
siding with Moscow's criticism of Beijing.
Immediately after Nixon's Moscow visit, the Soviet
Union dispatched two separate delegations to North Korea.
The first delegation,

composed of Foreign Ministry officials,

came to Pyongyang apparently to inform the North Koreans of
the Nixon-Brezhnev talks and agreements.

During the confer

ence, the Soviet Union reportedly agreed to increase its
deliveries of certain industrial equipment and raw materials,
to expand scientific and technical cooperation.
The display of friendship between Moscow and Pyong
yang during these periods served the common interests of
both countries.

For North Korea, the display of friendship

toward the Soviets might have been a well-planned act of
political maneuvering both to reassure Soviet assistance and
to warn Beijing not to go too far in its relations with Wash
ington.

For the Soviet Union, it was a good opportunity to

bring North Korea closer to its side by capitalizing on Pyong
yang' s apprehension over the new Sino-American relationship.
Despite the warm display of North Korean-Soviet cooperation
and the obvious campaign that the Russians waged to promote
their influence in North Korea at China's expense, the Soviet
Union apparently had only limited success.

The North Korean

refrained from siding with Moscow against Beijing*

In gen

eral, North Korea appeared to be still closer to Beijing
than to Moscow.

66
Foreign Trade As An Indicator of
Sino-Soviet Conflict
Looking Back
The Chinese have always been exceptionally reluc
tant to publish meaningful data on any aspect of their
economic situation, and in foreign trade, Moscow and Beijing
continue to conceal the nature and full extent of their eco
nomic ties.
However,

during the Stalin period, the Soviet Union

negotiated directly with the Manchurian warlord in July,
1949, concerning the restoriation of Soviet-dismantled
industries in Manchuria, but the final treaty of April,
1950, designated the contracting parties as the PRC and the
Soviet Union.

Thus, the PRC were temporarily forced to

assume the obligations which Manchuria incurred as a result
of her relatively weaker bargaining position.
From then on, Soviet machines, equipment,

and other

industrial goods were exchanged for industrial and agricul
tural raw materials from the PRC.

Sino-Soviet trade was

more closely geared to Chinese than to Soviet requirements.
Some of the Soviet deliveries, however, were simply transfers
of captured Chinese assets and reparations or of military aid
consigned from stocks stored during the Korean W a r . ^
^Griffith,

Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 231.
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TABLE I
SOVIET-SINO TRADE
(in Million U.S. Dollars)

Ye ar

Soviet
Exports
to PRC

Soviet
Imports
from PRC

Turnover

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
I960
1961
1962
1963
1964

742.50
733.00
544.00
633*90
954.45
817.00
367.33
233.21
187.03
135.20

643.50
764.25
738.25
881.20
1100.25
848.00
551-44
515.84
412.59
313.91

1386.00
1497.25
1282.25
1515.10
2054.70
I665.OO
918.77
749.03
559.62
449.11

99.00

Total surpluses

99.00

Balance
PRC
Soviet
31.25
194.25
247.30
145.80
31.00
184.11
284.61
225.56
178.71
1520.59

Sources:
National Foreign Assessment Center,
Central Intelligence Agency, China: Economic Indicators
(Washington, D.C.: December, 1978)i
39» The Soviet
Union:
Figures-Facts-Data (United States Government Manual)
(New York:
K.G. Saur Publishers, 1979)i PP« 351-356.

When the PRC was suffering from the dislocation of
agricultural collectivization post-1956,^ the decline in
Soviet deliveries aggravated their disenchantment.

Further

more, during the same period, the Soviet Union launched a
massive aid program to the neutralist countries (mainly
Egypt,

Indonesia,

and India) thereby significantly reallo

cating its foreign aid resources,
-^Ibidj), p. 233*

a step which must have
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infuriated the PRC’s leadership and further worsened SinoSoviet relations.
TABLE II
SOVIET-INDIAN TRADE COMPARED WITH
SOVIET EXPORTS TO PRC
(in Million U.S. Dollars)

Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
i960
1961
1962
1963
1964

Soviet -Indian Trade
Soviet
Soviet
Turnover
Inrports
Exports
11.6
57.8
84.5
94.8
101.0
91.0
119.0
168.0
316.4
390.2

5.2
26.4
36.8
49.0
63.2
6 3 .O
65.5
83.0
94.7
155.7

6.4
31.4
4 7.7
45.8
37.7
28.0
53.5
85.0
221.7
234.5

Soviet-Sino Trade
Soviet Exports
742.5
733.0
544.0
633.9
954.5
817.0
367.3
233.2
187.0
135.2

Sources s Records and Statistics*
Quarterlv
Bulletin of Eastern Economist X(4) (August 19^9). (New
Delhi: Asia Press, ) p. 220; Records and Statistics *
Quarterly Bulletin of Eastern Economist XII(4) (August
1966), (New Delhi*
Asia Press), p. 216.

In the case of Moscow's policy and gesture towards
India (between 1955 and 1962, the Soviet Union granted loans
to India amounting to $800 m i l l i o n ) , ^
watching with utmost sensitivity,

which the PRC was

a brief chronological

comparison of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian trade relations
-^Between 1955 and 1962, the Soviet Union granted
loans to India amounting to $800 million (New Age. Septem
ber 23, 1962), an amount close to the excess of Soviet
deliveries over imports from China prior to 1955*
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seems appropriate, even though the magnitude of India's
exchange of goods with the Soviet Union was not in the same
digital category.

Soviet exports to the PRC thus declined

markedly from 1956 through 1958.

While Soviet-Indian trade

jumped more than 500 percent, decline in Soviet exports to
the PRC during 1961 paralleled by a near doubling of exports
to India, the same trend continued during 1964.
Consequently, when the Soviet Union upheld India
which was another rivalry of the PRC, the reaction of the
PRC was tremendously jealous.

In other words, as India was

at high tide with the Soviet Union in foreign trade, the
PRC was at low tide with the Soviet Union.
alternatively oscillated from 1955 "to 1964.

This phenomenon
Therefore, the

foreign trade as an indicator is valuable to evaluate the
relationship between two countries.
Sino-Soviet Foreign Trade
Then in i960, following the Sino-Soviet split, the
PRC made a deliberate, major shift in the direction of their
foreign trade, essentially for political reasons.
1950, the choice was not wholly Beijing's,

As in

since Moscow

withdrew all Soviet technicians from PRC and tried to use
economic pressure to change PRC policies.

But clearly Bei

jing, on its part, decided to disentangle its interests from
Moscow's, and In the 1960s it rebuffed all Soviet attempts
to restore old ties.

As a result, trade with the Soviet
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Union dropped rapidly.
trade in 1964.

It declined to 34

percent of total

Sino-Soviet relations went from bad to

worse, culminating in the Chempao Island incident and the
sharp border clashes of 1969# then in 1969 trade with the
Soviet Union was $56 million, a mere 1.4 percent of PRC's
total trade.

In the 1970s, trade with the Soviet Union

again rose in absolute terms, but it continued to decline
as a percentage of total trade,

in 1970 trade with the

Soviet Union dwindled to 1 percent at its low point, and
in 1978 trade with the Soviet Union, totalling $338 mil
lion, was only 1.6 percent of PRC's total trade.
Violations of the Armistice Agreement As An
Indicator of the Stability of the
Korean Peninsula
For divided Korea, where the lowlands and mountains
separating the two sides have been difficult to police,
large-scale infiltration has probably been checked in recent
years by the installation of a fence and supporting defensive
position.

The success of these defensive efforts was then

reflected by an increase in clandestine seaborne landings
along South Korea's craggy coastline.

After concluding the

truce between North and South Korea in 1953# there were
countless violations of the armistice agreement.

While 58

violations of the armistice agreement by the North were
reported in 1971# this was 50^ less than the total in 1970.
In 1972# however, no significant incidents or exchanges of
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TABLE III
SOVIET-SINO TRADE
(in Million U.S. Dollars)

Year

Soviet
Exports
to PRC

Soviet
Imports
from PRC

Turnover

1964
1965
1966
1967
1963
1969
1970
.1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1973

135.20
191.48
171.16
50.28
59.27
27.75
24.89
77.89
120.87
136.50
143.25
128.64
238.54
160.78
174.90

313.91
225.33
142.97
5 6 .6l
36.63
28.97
21.67
76.22
133.17
136.91
139.42
149.43
178.51
176.44
I6 3 .8O

4 4 9 .ll
416.81
318.13
106.89
95.90
56.72
46.56
154.11
254.04
273.41
282.67
278.07
417.05
337.22
338.70

PRC Trade
Soviet
Trade
Ratio
Total
3,220
3,880
4,24 5
3,915
3,785
3,895
4, 340
4,810
6,000
10,300
14,080
14,575
13,275
15,055
21,100

14
10.7
7.5
2.7
2.5
1.4
1.1
3.2
4.2
2.7
2.0
1.9
3.1
2.2
1.6

Sources: National Foreign Assessment Center, Cent:
Intelligence Agency. Chinas Economic Indicators (Washingt
D.C. : December, 1978), p. 39.

fire were noted in the DM2 or in South Korea--a shift that
can only be attributed to high policy decisions apd not to
improved defense systems.

The total number of significant

incidents and exchanges of fire within the DM2 and inside
the South Korea plotted over time were as shown in Table
IV--Violations of the Armistice Agreement by North Korea.
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TABLE IV
VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
BY NORTH KOREA
Year

Violations

Intensity Ratio

19 65
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

88
80
784
985
188
181
84
0

2.4
2.2
21.5
27.0
5*2
5*0
2.3
0.0

Sources:
Walter C. Clemens, "Grit at Panmunjom:
Conflict and Cooperation in a divided Korea," Asian Survey
13(6), (1973) s536.

By the way, this writer's assumption was "the more
intense Sino-Soviet competition becomes over North Korea,
the more independent military actions of North Korea will
become"

We have to test an association between two pro

perties— Sino-Soviet competition and North Korean military
actions.
In Figure 4, the difference between the Sino-Soviet
conflict and North Korean military actions is not signifi
cant.

Shown on Tables III and IV, a t-test was utilized

that would test for a significant difference between two
means of independent samples.
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Sources:
Richard K. Ashley, The Political Economy
of War and Peace (New York:
Nichols Publishing Company,
1980), .p . 86"; and graphing of the Violations of the Armis
tice Agreement by North Korea— Table IV.

74
t

Above equation,

X

an estimate of

J

1

N 1 + N2 + 2

= 130.93.
The following results were obtained:
+

298.75 - 4.16
=
130.93

=2.25

There was no significant difference between the Sino-Soviet
conflict and North Korean military actions.
t-test was as follows:

t = 2 .2 5 «

results would have had to be:

The results of

To be significant,

(t) = 2.365 or more.

the
Subse

quently, there is no significant difference between the SinoSoviet conflict and North Korean military actions.
Finally, this writer can accept the project hypothesis— "the more intense Sino-Soviet competition becomes
over North Korea, the more independent military actions of
North Korea will become."
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The Sino-Soviet dispute has had major implications
for North Korea in formulating policy toward Beijing and
Moscow.

The dispute presented a serious dilemma to the

North Korean leaders because various

political, economic

and military factors made it difficult for them to avoid
alienating either of the neighboring communist powers.

How

ever, the dispute presented an opportunity to deal with the
two powers in such a way as to augment North Korea’s nation
al interest.
By the autumn of 1962, the North Korean regime had
begun gradually to lean toward the Chinese line in the
course of the communist camps' dispute over such matters
as Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, the Sino-Indian border
dispute.

From the beginning of 1963 until Khrushchev's

downfall in October,

1964, North Korea became Beijing's

strongest ally in Asia in the Sino-Soviet rift.
But Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 changed the situa
tion.

While North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union

began to improve, its relations with China deteriorated
slowly.

This change reflected an altered view of North
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Korea's national interests

namely, Pyongyang's desire to

modernize its armed forces with new weapons as well as to
seek economic assistance from the Soviet Union.

However,

this change did not mean the conversion of the North Kor
ean regime to the Soviet line, nor did it mean a return to
the pre-1950 Soviet-North Korean relationship.

Rather,

North Korea returned to a neutralist posture in the SinoSoviet dispute.
At the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in
1969» North Korea and China restored their friendly rela
tions.

The major factors contributing to the revival of

Pyongyang-Beijing friendship were their mutual interest in
improving the deteriorated relationship that had existed
during the 1966-1969 period and their common fear of Jap
an* s growing strength, which was becoming increasingly
evident.

But despite its warm relations with China, North

Korea continued to maintain substantial ties with the
Soviet Union.
President Nixon's visits to Beijing and Moscow in
1972 undoubtedly caused serious apprehension within the
North Korean regime.

North Korea was more concerned with

the outcome of Nixon's trip to Beijing than with his journew to Moscow.

Pyongyang and Moscow fully shared their

apprehension over Nixon's visit to Beijing, and the Soviet
Union apparently used the situation to promote its influence
in North Korea at China's expense by exchanging high-ranking
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delegations and by providing additional economic and mili
tary assistance.

But the Soviet Union achieved only partial

success.
Most Asian communist regimes and parties seem to
be trying to preserve relations with both Moscow and Bei
jing without being excessively dependent upon, or subor
dinate to, either.

Kim Il-Sung's domestic and foreign

policies claimed to be, and to a large extent were, based
on the principle of chuche (self-reliance).

For economic,

military, and political reasons, however, North Korea most
likely will continue to live in the shadow of the two com
munist powers:

The Soviet Union, to which North Korea owes

its creation immediately after World War II, and China, to
which North Korea owes its survival during the Korean War.
This thesis tested the relationship between SinoSoviet conflict and North Korean military actions.

The

writer found that there was no correlationship between two
variables.

Foreign trade as an indicator of conflict be

tween two countries was valuable data.

But other indica-

%

tors, for example, foreign investment, technology exchanges,
sports events, and visitors, could be utilized to measure
the relationship between two countries.
As long as the Sino-Soviet dispute continues, North
Korea indeed is and increasingly will be in a delicate posi
tion in its relations with the two neighboring powers, both
very sensitive about their prestige and power position.
Therefore, the Pyongyang regime will probably continue to
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be cautious and cricumspect on issues and events that divide
Moscow and Beijing, while attempting to maintain correct and
balanced relations with both Beijing and Moscow.
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